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IDENTITY, SPEECH, AND EQUALITY
Nan D. Hunter*
M experience as a litigator tells me that the First Amendment
as provided the most reliable path to success of any of the doc-
trinal claims utilized by lesbian and gay rights lawyers. Certainly no
other block of cases can rival the success rate of the cases seeking
recognition and even funding of lesbian and gay student organiza-
tions, all of which were brought on First Amendment grounds and
ultimately won by plaintiffs.1
My experience as a lesbian teaches me that silence and denial have
been the linchpins of second-class status. In almost any context that a
lesbian or gay American faces, whether it be the workplace, the mili-
tary, the courts, or the family, the bedrock question is usually, is it
safe to be out?
Patricia Cain's article on the history of the lesbian and gay legal
movement provides a great service to scholars and activists in the field
by taking the first steps in chronicling the story of gay rights litigation
efforts since the late 19th century. I want to add to Professor Cain's
project by identifying what I think is the most important theme aris-
ing from the modem gay rights movement, which is the relationship
between expression and equality.
The growth in the lesbian and gay rights movement has generated
more speech about sexuality. My argument is that it also has created
a different kind of speech. Lesbian and gay rights lawyers are fighting
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A. Northwestern University, J.D.
Georgetown University Law Center.
I have been active in several of the cases and events discussed in this Article. I was co-
counsel for plaintiffs in Gay Men's Health Crisis v. Sullivan and Finley v. National
Endowment for the Arts, and I represented the Strafford County Family Planning Association
in its negotiations with state and federal officials. In addition, I was an invited participant in
the conference sponsored by the Centers for Disease Control in 1987.
1 See Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988); Gay Students
Services v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984); Gay Lib v. University of Mo.,
558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); Gay Alliance of Students v.
Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner,
509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974); Student Coalition for Gay Rights v. Austin Peay State Univ., 477
F. Supp. 1267 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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a battle in both judicial and legislative arenas over the fundamental
question of the scope of public discourse. Our claims set forth the
first serious demand that speech about sexuality be treated as core
political speech. This development marks a radical shift in First
Amendment doctrine, provoking a category crisis of whether to treat
sexual speech as part of a shared social dialogue or as second-tier
quasi-obscenity. The change in legal doctrine has altered political
thought as well. It signals the conceptualization of sexuality-and
specifically homosexuality-as a political idea.
Lesbian and gay rights legal claims have further complicated the
expression-equality dynamic. As it has emerged in lesbian and gay
rights case law, "identity" is a multilayered concept. The idea of
identity is more complicated and unstable than either simply status or
conduct. It encompasses explanation and representation of the self.
Self-representation of one's sexual identity necessarily includes a
message that one has not merely come out, but that one intends to be
out-to act on and live out that identity.
Notions of identity increasingly form the basis for gay and lesbian
equality claims. Those claims merge not only status and conduct, but
also viewpoint, into one whole. To be openly gay, when the closet is
an option, is to function as an advocate as well as a symbol. The
centrality of viewpoint to gay identity explains the logic behind what
has become the primary strategy of anti-gay forces: the attempted
penalization of those who "profess" homosexuality, in a series of "no
promo homo" campaigns.
This essay analyzes the history of the relationship between expres-
sion, equality, and privacy in the state's regulation of sexuality. It
traces the development of identity concepts in law and the general
shift from privacy to equality claims. Within this story, speech is a
constant thread; in a changing context, however, First Amendment
assertions have evolved into a new kind of claim. Identity politics has
led to identity speech.
I. THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
One can date the first stage of the lesbian and gay civil rights move-
ment as occurring from 1950 to 1975. The three strands of doctrine
that still dominate the field-privacy, equality, and expression-mate-
rialized during that period. Because the focus of the early cases and
legislation was on sexual conduct, privacy became the primary intel-
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Commentary
lectual bulwark of rights advocates. The Hart-Devlin debate about
sodomy law, in which Millsian notions of liberty warred with invoca-
tions of communally-defined morality, provided the paradigmatic
text. By the end of this period, however, equality and expression
claims had also emerged in gay rights litigation.
Beginning after World War II, homosexuals as a class of persons
were demonized in U.S. politics as subversives capable of destroying
society and the state. As a 1950 Senate report on sex perversion
among federal workers warned, "[o]ne homosexual can pollute a Gov-
ernment office."' 2 In response to a panic about "[t]he [h]omosexual
[m]enace,"I the government sought to purge its military, its teaching
corps, its workforce, and its immigrants of persons who were homo-
sexual. President Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10,450 in 1953,
which declared "sexual pervasion" inconsistent with the national
security and thus rendered lesbians and gay men presumptively unfit
for government employment.4
During this postwar period, the state used homosexual identity' as
a mechanism of repression. It was the government that sought to
impose identity as a public classification onto private acts. The state's
ascertainment and exposure of private conduct created a forced public
status, often accompanied by a confession, or forced speech. Knowl-
edge of sexual conduct provided the means for identifying individuals
and expelling them from public institutions, for-in the words of the
Senate report-"detecting and removing perverts." 6 In this frame-
work, conduct defined homosexual identity.
2 Senate Comm. on Expenditures in the Exec. Dep'ts, Employment of Homosexuals and
Other Sex Perverts in Gov't, S. Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950) [hereinafter
Employment of Homosexuals in Gov't].
3 See John D'Emilio, The Homosexual Menace: the Politics of Sexuality in Cold War
America, in Passion and Power: Sexuality and History 226, 226 (Kathy Peiss & Christina
Simmons eds., 1989).
4 Exec. Order No. 10,450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
5 It is at best tricky and perhaps wrong to use the term "identity" in analyzing the social
concepts extant during the early postwar period. Self-consciousness about a homosexual
identity was then in its infancy among lesbians and gay men; although the African-American
civil rights movement was starting to emerge as a political force, the idea of identity politics
had yet to develop. With these reservations, I nonetheless use the idea of "identity" in
describing the process by which legal arguments helped shape a new social meaning for
homosexuality and "the homosexual."
6 Employment of Homosexuals in Gov't, supra note 2, at 9.
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Further, homosexuality became synonymous with a psychological
type. The state treated the identity which it imposed as mental ill-
ness. The military took the lead in this shift during World War II,
changing its approach to homosexuality from a brain disease model to
a developmental personality model.7 In 1952, Congress followed suit
by repealing a 1917 provision in the immigration laws that had
excluded individuals from emigrating to the United States who were
persons of "constitutional psychopathic inferiority."8 This "constitu-
tional inferiority" was explained in a Senate report as meaning per-
sons with "tainted blood," or "medical traits" that would harm the
populace of the United States.9 In its place, Congress substituted a
provision that emphasized not constituent defects, but a more incho-
ate psychological illness: "psychopathic personality."' 10 This latter
phrase broadened the focus of the law to include "disorders of the
personality.... Individuals with such a disorder may manifest a dis-
turbance of intrinsic personality patterns, exaggerated personality
trends, or are persons ill primarily in terms of society and the prevail-
ing culture."1"
The new category was necessary because Congress believed that the
previous approach had failed to identify homosexuals as a group to be
excluded. The Senate report recommended that "the classes of men-
tally defectives... be enlarged to include homosexuals and other sex
perverts."1 2 By classifying the homosexual as a psychological type of
person because he committed certain acts, Congress, like the military,
merged homosexual acts and homosexual identity.
As a defense against public exposure, individuals sought to preserve
their anonymity. Paradoxically, this desire for secrecy helped to cre-
ate a zone in which a more public and collective gay identity could
grow. The litigation surrounding gay bars and early gay organiza-
tions illustrates how the idea of privacy as a shield against the state
functioned both to perpetuate secrecy and to help generate a visible
social community.
7 Allan Berube, Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World
War Two 13, 139-41 (1990).
8 Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, The Immigration and Naturalization Systems of the
United States, S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Congress, 2d Sess. 343 (1950).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 345.
11 Id.
12 Id.
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After courts started to resist attempts to close the bars entirely, the
state relied on intermittent raids against lesbian and gay bars, ostensi-
bly to monitor for unlawful conduct, as a tactic to repress the then-
nascent lesbian and gay subculture.13  Often these raids served pri-
marily to expose the identities of bar patrons, sometimes by publica-
tion of names in local newspapers. 14 Fighting to end the police raids
was necessary, at least in part, not only to preserve one's anonymity,
but also to retain the opportunity to congregate in virtually the only
gay- or lesbian-positive venues in existence at the time. Secrecy also
figured prominently in concerns about joining homophile groups.
The ability to maintain secrecy of membership strengthened organiza-
tions whose very existence undermined the closet. Secrecy furnished
the precondition for its very opposite, expression.' 5
The success of privacy arguments also began the process of teasing
acts and identity apart. Perhaps the most significant development in
lesbian and gay rights law prior to the 1970s occurred outside the
realm of litigation, when the American Law Institute, in publishing
its Model Penal Code, dropped any prohibition of sodomy. 16 Begin-
ning with Illinois in 1961, twenty-one states decriminalized sodomy
by adopting the Model Penal Code. 17 Privacy concepts provided the
philosophical basis for this legislative reform.' 8 In federal employ-
ment, the privacy-grounded claim that adverse employment action
13 John D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual
Minority in the United States 1940-1970 31-33, 49-50, 186-88 (1983); John D'Emilio & Estelle
B. Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America 290-94 (1988); Arthur S.
Leonard, The Gay Bar and the Right to Hang Out Together, in Arthur S. Leonard, Sexuality
and the Law: An Encyclopedia of Major Legal Cases 190-96 (1993).
14 D'Emilio & Freedman, supra note 13, at 294. Occasionally, police attempts to record
identities of gay individuals have been used tactically against the police. See, e.g., Cyr v.
Walls, 439 F. Supp. 697, 704-05 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (allowing the individuals whose presence at
various gay functions was recorded by the police to be added to the class in a civil rights action
against police officers).
15 See E. Carrington Boggan, Marilyn G. Haft, Charles Lister & John P. Rupp, The Rights
of Gay People 10-12 (1975) [hereinafter The Rights of Gay People]. In this edition of the
ACLU's guide for laypersons, in the chapter on speech and association, there is extensive
discussion of how to keep one's group membership secret and no discussion of the law
pertaining to public protest.
16 Model Penal Code § 213.2 cmt. 2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962, Revised Comments
1980).
17 Lesbians, Gay Men and the Law 88, 92 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993).
1I See Model Penal Code § 213.2; see also H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality 14-15
(1963) (noting how privacy concerns underlie the Model Penal Code's dropping of the
prohibition against sodomy).
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could not be based on off-hours conduct led to first a United States
Court of Appeals decision, Norton v. Macy, 19 establishing that princi-
ple, then a Civil Service directive,20 and finally an amendment to the
code governing federal workers.2'
These reforms provided the legal shelter for conduct but not iden-
tity. The legislative repeals rendered sodomy a legally neutral act
rather than a criminal one in a significant number of states. Federal
workers gained protection for the same "act of perversion" that had
rendered them unemployable under Eisenhower's executive order.
Gradually, homosexual conduct became increasingly lawful, while the
extreme stigma associated with the person of the homosexual
remained.
Affirmative declarations of homosexuality lay beyond the shelter of
tolerance for secret acts. Speech about homosexuality was just begin-
ning to emerge during this period. Until 1958, under the tendency-to-
corrupt-morals test, the test for obscenity that preceded the current
standard,22 courts treated the promotion or advocacy of homosexual-
ity as obscene. Two milestone cases illustrate how the law judged
homosexuality as subject matter under the First Amendment. In find-
ing Radclyffe Hall's The Well of Loneliness obscene in 1929, a New
York judge wrote that "[tihe book can have no moral value, since it
seeks to justify the right of a pervert to prey upon normal members of
a community, and to uphold such relationship as noble and lofty. ' '23
In a ruling nearly thirty years later, the Ninth Circuit found the Mat-
tachine Society's monthly political and literary magazine "One" to be
19 417 F.2d 1161, 1165 (D.C.Cir. 1969) (holding that off-hours homosexual conduct could
not be basis of dismisal unless it effected work performance).
20 Ashton v. Civiletti, 613 F.2d 923, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting Civil Service Bulletin,
Dec. 21, 1993).
21 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) (1988).
22 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957), abandoned the tendency-to-corrupt-
morals test, substituting a test that asked "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prudent interest." The current standard, adopted in Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 24-25 (1973), asks 1), whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find that the work appeals to the prurient interest; 2), whether the work in
question depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and 3), whether the
work as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
23 People v. Friede, 233 N.Y.S. 565, 567 (Mag. Ct. 1929).
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obscene and thus not mailable.24 The court based its finding of
obscenity on one short story described as "nothing more than cheap
pornography calculated to promote lesbianism" and one poem about
gay male sexual activities that "pertains to sexual matters of such a
vulgar and indecent nature that it tends to arouse a feeling of disgust
and revulsion. ' 2 The judicial equating of the affirmation of homosex-
uality with obscenity ended when, without opinion, the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in early 1958, citing its then-new
obscenity standard that had dropped moral corruption as its
touchstone.26
Claims involving an explicit combination of speech and due process
grounds began in the 1970s. These cases arose when public employees
challenged discriminatory treatment in their employment after having
themselves made their homosexuality public information. 27  They
brought hybrid claims based on due process and First Amendment
rights, rather than equality, and the courts essentially treated speech
as a form of off-duty conduct, subject to the same kind of nexus analy-
sis as the D.C. Circuit had promulgated in Norton .28 Their cases rose
or fell on whether the courts found that their speech had been suffi-
ciently disruptive of the workplace to justify their firing.2 9
24 One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 371 (1958). For a
description of the magazine and its role in the homophile movement, see D'Emilio, supra note
13, at 109-15.
25 One, Inc, 241 F.2d at 777.
26 The Supreme Court's ruling consisted of one sentence reversing the lower court and a
citation to Roth v. United States. One, Inc., 355 U.S. 371, 371. The Court's opinion thus did
not address the specific question of whether promotion of homosexuality, at least if eroticized,
could be a component of obscenity. In Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), however,
the Court ruled that nudity in gay male-oriented body-building magazines was no "more
objectionable" than comparable female nudity "that society tolerates." Id. at 490. The Day
decision laid the groundwork for the growth of a national gay press. See Leonard, supra note
13, at 209.
27 Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 304 (1981) (en
banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d
247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977); Acanfora v. Board of Educ.,
491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d
193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972).
28 Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (requiring a connection between
employee's conduct and the efficiency of the service provided by the government agency).
29 Compare Van Ooteghem, 628 F.2d at 490-93 (holding that it was a violation of plaintiff's
First Amendment right to free speech to fire him for addressing a public body on the civil
rights of homosexuals) with McConnell, 451 F.2d at 196 (holding that the fact that plaintiff
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The next stage in the developing interrelationship between expres-
sion and equality emerged in the student organization cases. Begin-
ning in the 1970s, lesbian and gay student organizations formed and
immediately encountered refusals by universities to recognize them as
legitimate campus groups. The universities argued that official recog-
nition would lead to criminal acts, relying primarily on the sodomy
laws. Courts invariably ruled for the students, concluding that the
Brandenburg test requiring intentional incitement to immediate law-
less action3" had not been met.3 ' In the student organization cases,
the judicial response quickly and comfortably drew on the preexisting
framework for analysis of the advocacy of unlawful conduct, making
these easy cases. Courts and litigators generally treated advocacy of
homosexuality as advocacy of conduct. 32
A focus on individual conduct dominated disputes about sexuality
and law during the postwar period, both in efforts of repression and of
defense. But its primacy had begun to weaken by the mid-1970s. The
very successes of privacy claims set the stage for a focus on identity
other than as defined by conduct. Declarations of homosexuality had
started to complicate speech law and to intertwine with notions of
equality. Identity only partially determined by conduct proved to be
a much more precarious concept and a more diffuse and shifting tar-
get for state repression.
II. THE BRIGGS INITIATIVE: "No PROMO HOMO" BEGINS
By consensus, the Stonewall rebellion in June 1969 marks the
beginning of the lesbian and gay political movement.3 During the
took activist role in implementing his unconventional ideas formed a sufficient basis for
denying plaintiff employment).
30 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
31 See Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1328 (5th Cir. 1984); Gay
Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 854 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978);
Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay Students Org.
of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir. 1974).
32 One district court, however, noted that "[h]ere we are not dealing with conduct, but with
the advocacy of the acceptability of conduct." Student Coalition for Gay Rights v. Austin Peay
State Univ., 477 F. Supp. 1267, 1274 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).
33 The event occurred at the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village, when the bar's patrons
spontaneously resisted what the police no doubt considered a routine raid. The resistance was
all the more dramatic because most of the patrons were drag queens in full dress, although one
observer credits a lesbian among the crowd with being the first to call on her compadres to
fight back. The ensuing struggle became a pitched battle between gays and police that
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subsequent decade, municipal legislatures began to enact amendments
to existing civil rights ordinances that extended coverage to sexual
orientation as a protected class.3 4 These breakthroughs in turn led to
a series of repeal campaigns in 1977 in which voters eliminated civil
rights protections in Dade County, Florida; St. Paul, Minnesota;
Wichita, Kansas; and Eugene, Oregon, in rapid succession.35 Speech
of various sorts obviously facilitated these events, but did not function
openly as a constituent part of what was at stake. It was nearly ten
years after Stonewall, in 1978, in the first political debate about homo-
sexuality outside urban centers or limited enclaves like universities,
that expression rather than conduct formed the core of the issue.
The Briggs Initiative appeared on the November 1978 California
state ballot as a referendum question that would have permitted the
firing of any school employee who engaged in the "advocating, solicit-
ing, imposing, encouraging or promoting of private or public homo-
sexual activity directed at, or likely to come to the attention of,
schoolchildren and/or other employees. ' ' 36 It was widely understood
to be a vote on whether the state should fire gay teachers and thus
purge that group from the schools and from contact with children.37
This understanding of the meaning of Briggs was consistent with the
older purge-the-homosexuals theme that had long dominated public
discussion.
But the Briggs Initiative was configured to play a double role. It
was framed in terms of banning a viewpoint, the "advocating" or
"promoting" of homosexuality, rather than the exclusion of a group
of persons. Lesbians and gay men easily fell within this proscription
because to come out is to implicitly, or often explicitly, affirm the
value of homosexuality. For that reason, a Briggs-style law could be
used to target all lesbian and gay school employees who had expressed
their sexual orientation, except in the most furtive contexts.
continued for hours in the streets of the Village. For a contemporaneous discussion of
Stonewall, see Lucian Truscott IV, Gay Power Comes to Sheridan Square, Village Voice, July
3, 1969, at 1, 18.
34 The Rights of Gay People, supra note 15, at 21.
35 Randy Shilts, The Mayor of Castro Street: The Life and Times of Harvey Milk 221
(1982).
36 Cal. Proposition 6, § 3(b)(2) (1978).
37 Shilts, supra note 35, at 212-51; Witch-hunting, The Economist, Oct. 28, 1978, at 50.
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The viewpoint target made the initiative more complicated, how-
ever. It threatened anyone, gay or straight, who voiced the forbidden
ideas. Thus it simultaneously discriminated against gay people while
extending its aim to everyone not gay who supported them.
The proposed law did not merely include the two distinct elements
of viewpoint bias and group classification. It merged them into one
new concept. This merger-what I would describe as the formation
of a legal construct of identity that incorporates both viewpoint and
status-would come to dominate both the right-wing strategy against
gay rights and the claims of the lesbian and gay community for
equality.
Early opinion polls indicated that the Briggs Initiative was likely to
pass." In efforts that became a model for the later response to AIDS,
the California lesbian and gay community mobilized on a scale that it
had never before attempted. Thousands of volunteers, many politi-
cally active for the first time, joined the anti-Briggs crusade, and mas-
sive fundraising supported a sophisticated advertising and public
relations campaign. 39 These efforts contrasted with the ineptness and
underfunding of the pro-Briggs campaign and combined with state-
ments opposing the initiative from a series of conservative political
leaders, most famously Ronald Reagan." The initiative was defeated
by a fifty-eight percent to forty-two percent vote.41
The Briggs Initiative referendum campaign marked the moment
when American politics began to treat homosexuality as something
more than deviance, conduct, or lifestyle; it marked the emergence of
homosexuality as an openly political claim and as a viewpoint. That,
in turn, laid the foundation for the emergence of a new analysis of
speech about homosexuality. Instead of treating such speech as the
advocacy of conduct, courts shifted to a consideration of gay speech
38 See Shilts, supra note 35, at 242; David B. Goodstein, Fighting the Briggs Brigade, The
Advocate, June 14, 1978, at 6; Poll Shows a Major Shift on Prop 6, Gay Community News,
Oct. 21, 1978, at 1.
39 See Scott Anderson, After Victories, Leaders Ponder the Next Step, The Advocate, Dec.
27, 1978, at 8-9.
40 See Shilts, supra note 35, at 245-49; Sasha Gregory-Lewis, Californians Face Proposition
6 and Will it Be Written, Mene, Mene, Tekel Upharsin?, The Advocate, Nov. 15, 1978, at 7-
12; Victory in California, Seattle; Miami Defeat, The Advocate, Dec. 13, 1978, at 9
[hereinafter Victory in California].
41 Victory in California, supra note 40, at 9.
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as the advocacy of ideas. The once-bright boundary between sexual
speech and political speech began to fade.
A year after the Briggs vote, the California Supreme Court ruled
that statements of homosexual identity constituted political speech
protected by the state's labor code.42 In a conclusion still unique in
judicial decisions, the court ruled that a complaint that the defendant
discriminated against "manifest" homosexuals and homosexuals who
make "'an issue of their homosexuality"' stated a cause of action
that defendants violated the labor code by trying to pressure employ-
ees to " 'refrain from adopting [a] particular course or line of political
... activity.' -43
Measured by these standards, the struggle of the homosexual commu-
nity for equal rights, particularly in the field of employment, must be
recognized as a political activity.... [O]ne important aspect of the
struggle for equal rights is to induce homosexual individuals to "come
out of the closet," acknowledge their sexual preferences, and to asso-
ciate with others in working for equal rights.'
This was the first ruling treating self-affirming "identity speech" as
explicitly political because of-rather than despite of-its expression
regarding sexuality, and not as a surrogate for, or prediction of,
conduct.45
By contrast, the federal courts, in adjudicating the constitutionality
of language identical to the Briggs Initiative, relied on reasoning that
avoided the question of whether promoting homosexuality could
qualify as political expression. Legislators in Oklahoma enacted the
same language rejected by voters in California, after Anita Bryant, a
former Miss Oklahoma who had led the effort to repeal the Dade
County civil rights provision, urged them to protect school children
42 Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 610-11 (Cal. 1979).
43 Id. at 611.
44 Id. at 610.
45 The Pacific Telephone case was settled with a $5 million payment to the plaintiff class and
the adoption by defendant of an antidiscrimination policy. Leonard, supra note 13, at 417. In
a later case, the California Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor Code's provisions protecting
employees' fundamental rights to engage in political activity free of employer interference also
applied to expressions of sexual orientation. Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., I Cal. Rptr. 2d
77, 87-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) appeal docketed, No. 5024102 (Cal. 1992). In 1992, the Labor
Code was amended to add an explicit protection. Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.1 (West 1993).
19931 Commentary 1705
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from persons who "profess homosexuality."'  The Tenth Circuit
found the Oklahoma statute overbroad because it had the potential to
reach such core political speech as a school employee's opinions in
favor of adopting a civil rights law or repealing a sodomy law.47 The
dissent attempted to create a new rule against incitement to sexual
conduct, arguing that although advocacy of "violence, sabotage and
terrorism" was protected under the Brandenburg test, advocacy of "a
crime malum in se"---"a practice as universally condemned as the
crime of sodomy"-should not qualify for First Amendment protec-
tion.4' Bryant's own phrase had captured the paradox, however: one
"professes" a belief, not an act.
III. HIV TESTING AS SPEECH
With the advent of the HIV epidemic in the early 1980s, gay male
sexuality became a topic of widespread political discussion and
debate. Although legal and social reaction ostensibly focused on the
disease, the disease itself was so closely associated with gay men in the
first years of the epidemic that much of the reaction seemed a euphe-
mism for opinions of male homosexuality.
In a narrow sense, most of the case law generated by and about
HIV falls outside the category of gay rights law. Litigators most often
based antidiscrimination claims on disability, not sexual orientation.49
Privacy claims were framed as protection against intrusive medical
tests, not the threat of forced disclosure of homosexuality that many
gay men anticipated from mandatory HIV testing.50
But in a broader and deeper sense, courts, Congress and state legis-
latures had begun a fight over which new social understanding about
homosexuality would supersede silence. At issue was the question of
what information would comprise public knowledge, and how the
46 Brief for Appellees at 2-3 n.3, Board of Educ. of Okla. City v. National Gay Task Force,
470 U.S. 903 (1985) (No. 83-2030).
47 National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ. of Okla. City, 729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir.
1984), aff'd per curiam ,470 U.S. 903 (1985). The Supreme Court ruled by an evenly divided
vote; Justice Lewis Powell took no part in the case because of illness. See Leonard, supra note
13, at 616.
48 National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1277 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
49 Arthur S. Leonard, Discrimination, in AIDS and the Law: A Guide for the Nineties 297
(Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993).
5o Scott Burrs, Testing, Disclosure, and the Right to Privacy, in AIDS and the Law, supra
note 49, at 115.
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government would define and enforce the boundaries of public dis-
course. Framed in this way, many aspects of AIDS law that we think
of as falling within the doctrinal category of privacy really center on
speech.
A. Reexamining the Testing Debate
This contest over public knowledge and discourse was fought first,
and most significantly, in the policy debate over education versus test-
ing. It quickly became a commonplace in policy discussions to note
that, in the absence of a cure, prevention was the only weapon against
the spread of HIV. 1 The contest then became how to define "preven-
tion": Would that term be interpreted to mean testing or education?52
The question became, in effect, which form of knowledge would be
available in the public realm.
Education efforts, including safe-sex education, required a public
discourse that was nonjudgmental of the individual and agnostic
toward sexual practices. It sought to promote greater knowledge
about sexualities and incited public discussion about specific sexual
acts. Testing campaigns, by contrast, emphasized a private procedure
that led to identification of those who were HIV-infected, and often to
reporting of that information to public health authorities.
Two competing "right-to-know" campaigns began. Conservatives
argued that the public most urgently needed to know who was
infected and thus who posed a danger. The gay community used pub-
lic health arguments to justify opening public fora such as schools and
broadcast media to an unprecedented discussion of male
homosexuality.
The combination of these arguments led to a two-part discourse by
each side. AIDS activists argued for widespread knowledge and
openness at the collective level and anonymity at the individual level,
51 See, e.g., Report of the Nat'l Comm'n on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome,
America Living with AIDS 19 (1991) ("Until a cure or a vaccine is found, education and
prevention are the only hope for altering the course of the HIV epidemic.").
52 Dennis Altman, Legitimation through Disaster: AIDS and the Gay Movement, in AIDS:
The Burdens of History 305 (Elizabeth Fee & Daniel M. Fox eds., 1988); see also AIDS
Research: Hearings on Dep'ts of Labor, Health and Human Servs., Education, and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1989, Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 294, 299 (1988) (written tesimony of Jeffrey Levi, National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force) (arguing for a greater emphasis in government AIDS spending on education as
compared to testing).
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especially in the context of the individual reporting information to the
state. Conservatives countered with arguments for revelation of infor-
mation about individuals to some state authority, together with
silence about sexuality in the public, collective discourse.
At the level of individual knowledge, HIV testing in the mid-1980s,
before treatments became available, (usually) functioned as exposure
of homosexuality with little or no benefit to the persons being tested.
As a result, gay rights groups attempted to dissuade the Food and
Drug Administration from licensing the antibody test in 1985.11 In
the end, the antibody test saved the nation's blood supply and, in the
process, probably averted what would have been a far worse social
panic had contaminated blood remained a real threat. But the test
also began to be used in exactly the way that rights advocates
feared-as a marker for identification and exclusion. 4
The testing debate within the administration climaxed in 1987. In
February of that year, the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") held
a massive conference on mandatory testing proposals for a variety of
populations. Hundreds of persons attended the conference, and the
major sessions were filmed and broadcast by video and television cam-
eras from platforms in the middle of cavernous rooms. CNN corre-
spondents conducted interviews of public health leaders and activists
from sets built outside the meeting halls and billed its day-long cover-
age as the "national AIDS meeting." The outcome of the conference
was a major setback to proponents of forced testing; the consensus
recommendations emphasized voluntariness and confidentiality and
urged the adoption of antidiscrimination protections.55
The CDC toned down these recommendations before transmitting
them upward in the chain of command, but retained the basic focus
53 See Ronald Bayer, Private Acts, Social Consequences: AIDS and the Politics of Public
Health 89-93 (1989); Dennis Altman, AIDS and the New Puritanism 74-78 (1986).
5 Almost immediately after licensure, the U.S. military began mass HIV screening of all
recruits and active duty personnel. Recruits who tested positive were rejected for service and
often informed of their HIV status with no counseling or information about the disease.
Military use of the test was soon followed by adoption of mandatory testing programs by the
Foreign Service and the Job Corps. Bayer, supra note 53, at 158-62; see also American Fed'n
of Gov't Employees v. Department of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987) (rejecting the
enjoining of the foreign service's mandatory AIDS testing).
55 Conference on the Role of AIDS Virus Antibody Testing in the Prevention and Control
of AIDS, Closing Plenary Session: Reports from the Workshops, Transcript of Proceedings
(Feb. 24-25, 1987).
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on consent and confidentiality. 6 The issue reached the Domestic Pol-
icy Council that spring. Then Surgeon General C. Everett Koop won
acceptance of a let-the-states-decide position on a number of testing
proposals, but could not stop the administration from undertaking
mandatory testing of federal prisoners and immigrants, groups more
characterized by their vulnerability to government control rather than
by any logical relationship to a risk of transmission. 7
For both sides in the debate over testing, knowledge of individuals'
status became an important fact in and of itself. For social conserva-
tives, screening and identification of the HIV-infected became a kind
of justified stigmata, a rite of expulsion, and a method of defining the
boundary of community and politics to reject the alien. For AIDS
activists, resistance to testing served as both a protective barrier
against those expulsions and also as a bargaining chip. Public health
officials desperately needed the cooperation of the gay community in
order for any prevention programs to succeed, and activists tacitly or
explicitly sought to trade cooperation in exchange for support of new
laws banning discrimination based on HIV status or sexual
orientation.
B. Public Discourse and the Legacy of Briggs
Although the debates over individual testing still continue and
remain important, a noticeable change in focus has occurred. In
1987, the same year that the testing controversy peaked, a major shift
occurred in the debate as a whole, as it evolved from a contest primar-
ily about knowledge of individual status to one increasingly about the
scope of public discourse.
In 1985, the CDC began funding educational programs aimed at
behavior change, which included support for some innovative pro-
grams undertaken by the Gay Men's Health Crisis ("GMHC"), a
New York City group that provides education and other services to
people infected with HIV. GMHC and other AIDS service organiza-
tions had always used private funds to develop their most provocative
materials, which sought to eroticize condom use and other safe-sex
56 Public Health Serv. Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.,
Recommended Additional Guidelines for HIV Antibody Counseling and Testing in the
Prevention of HIV Infection and AIDS, at 9-13 (Apr. 30, 1987).
57 See Bayer, supra note 53, at 164. The final recommendations were published at 36
Morbidity and Mortality Wdy. Rep. 509 (Aug. 14, 1987).
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practices. Officials at CDC became alarmed, however, by the poten-
tial for conservative backlash against the agency for supporting a gay
organization engaged in controversial work.5 8 In January 1986, the
CDC first promulgated restrictions on the content of federally-funded
programs, requiring that all such materials must use language that
"would be judged by a reasonable person to be unoffensive to most
educated adults. 5 9
In 1987, this issue reached Congress. In October, Senator Jesse
Helms introduced an amendment to the appropriations bill for the
Department of Health and Human Services that forbade use of any
CDC funds "to provide AIDS education, information, or prevention
materials and activities that promote or encourage, directly or indi-
rectly, homosexual sexual activities"6°----language that closely tracked
that of the Briggs Initiative. Unlike Briggs, however, the Helms bill
was unstoppable. Opponents succeeded only in deleting the term
"indirectly," thus arguably limiting its scope to the most graphic
materials.
The Helms Amendment combined the Briggs Initiative's one-stroke
targeting of both gay people and pro-gay ideas with the most success-
ful argument made by the anti-choice movement in the abortion
debate: that public funds should not be used to "subsidize" activity
associated with what conservatives paint as sexual permissiveness.
The difference here was simply that the target group was gay men
rather than indigent women. And, unlike abortions, the funded activ-
ity, education, was public in its nature, raising the questions of how
and on what terms the nation would discuss AIDS. In fact, gay-
targeted educational campaigns were very unlikely to be seen outside
gay venues, but the right launched an attack that spread from the safe
sex comics and erotic videos distributed in gay bars to sex education
and condom availability in the schools.
The debate on adoption of the Helms Amendment centered on
objections raised by Senator Helms to AIDS education efforts within
58 Marlene Cimons, AIDS Education Grants Frozen, L.A. Times, Dec. 4, 1985, at 12.
59 51 Fed. Reg. 3431 (1986).
60 133 Cong. Rec. 14,267 (1987). The Labor-Health and Human Services Appropriations
Act for Fiscal Year 1988 provided that "none of the funds made available under this Act to the
Centers for Disease Control shall be used to provide AIDS education, information, or
prevention materials and activities that promote or encourage, directly, homosexual
activities." Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 514(a), 101 Stat. 1329-289 (1988).
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the gay male community, specifically those of the GMHC. Senator
Helms made clear, repeatedly, that his objections were based on his
views of what was moral and that the purpose of his amendment was
to insure that the content of AIDS education be made to conform to
what he believed to be moral precepts of behavior, which for him
meant absolute opposition to homosexuality or any tolerance for it.
Senator Helms paraphrased the GMHC proposal, noting that
AIDS education sessions (all of which were specifically targeted for
gay male participants) included discussions of "a positive sense of gay
pride." 61 He continued:
Then... we get to session 5 and session 6 .... This is entitled
"Guidelines for Healthy Sex." ... The behavioral objectives of these
two sessions included the ability to "list satisfying, erotic alternatives
to high-risk sexual practices; identify erogenous areas of the body,"-
and here is here [sic] I get embarrassed-"other than the genitals,
that produce an erotic response."
Oh boy....
There is no mention of any moral code .... Good Lord, Mr. Presi-
dent, I may throw up.62
Senator Helms reiterated throughout the debate his intent that the
amendment was designed to forbid publicly-funded AIDS education
materials from advocacy of homosexuality: "Yes, it will require us to
make a moral judgment. I think it is about time we started making
some moral judgments and stop playing around with all those esoteric
things and saying 'Yes but.' I believe, Mr. President, it is time to
draw the line."' 63 Senator Helms concluded by stating: "What the
amendment does is to propose that we ensure that any money spent
for such purposes is not spent in such a way that even comes close to
condoning or encouraging or promoting intravenous drug use or sex-
ual activity outside of a sexually monogamous marriage including
homosexual activities." 64
In the course of the debate, Senator Helms amended his original
proposed language to focus its prohibitions specifically on materials
61 133 Cong. Rec. 14,203 (1987).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 14,204.
64 Id. at 14,208.
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which promoted homosexual activities only, and not all premarital or
extramarital activities, thereby accentuating the invidiousness of the
targeted suppression. Immediately before the final vote, Senator
Helms summed up the provision:
Earlier, Mr. President, on this floor, I read from grant presentation
documents prepared by the Gay Men's Health Crisis of New York
City. That is a corporation. It is unmistakably clear that those activi-
ties are being federally funded and are promoting and encouraging
homosexuality.... Therefore, Mr. President, it should be clear that in
adopting this amendment, if in fact it is adopted, this Senate is
prohibiting further funding for programs such as those sponsored,
operated by the Gay Men's Health Crisis Corp. that promote or
encourage homosexual sexual relations.6"
Restrictions on content remained in place for several years. The
Helms language was rejected in the next year's appropriations bill, in
favor of a provision that neutralized its anti-gay focus while retaining
some limitations on speech. The new language, known as the Ken-
nedy-Cranston Amendment, limited funding only if AIDS educa-
tional materials were "designed" to encourage sexual activity,
whether heterosexual or homosexual.6 Under this intent require-
ment, materials that were designed to reduce HIV transmission, but
were erotic as part of that design, were supposed to be exempt from
the limitation because they were not "solely and specifically" intended
to encourage sexual activity.67 Senator Helms vehemently opposed
the Kennedy-Cranston Amendment, accusing its supporters of
attempting to render his own approach "nugatory. 68
In fact, however, despite the Kennedy-Cranston Amendment, the
CDC retained its own "offensiveness" restrictions until they were
65 Id. at 14,219.
66 The Kennedy-Cranston Amendment stated:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, AIDS education programs funded by
the Centers for Disease Control and other education curricula funded under this Act
dealing with sexual activity-
(1) shall not be designed to promote or encourage, directly, intravenous drug abuse
or sexual activity, homosexual or heterosexual.
67 134 Cong. Rec. 10,025 (1988) (statement of Sen. Cranston); see also id. at 17,005
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating that the bill was written so as to prevent funding of
programs designed solely to promote or encourage sexual activity).
68 Id. at 10,027.
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found invalid by a federal district court in 1992,69 a ruling that the
government declined to appeal. The court found the language of
"offensive[ness]" to be void for vagueness 70 and also ruled that the
CDC's standard violated an AIDS-related statute that prohibited fed-
eral funding only to materials that were found to be obscene.71
In sum, although few of the judicial opinions addressing AIDS-
related issues focus on expression, the politics of speech profoundly
shaped AIDS policy. AIDS policies, in turn, transformed public dis-
course on homosexuality, more so than any other event to that time,
including Stonewall, Briggs, or the battles over municipal and state
civil rights laws.
By the the late 1980s, the angle of attack was clearly directed at
homosexual ideas as embodied in the gay community and not simply
at gay persons as such. Dozens of AIDS service organizations, many
openly affiliated with gay community groups, received millions of dol-
lars of CDC funding for education and other prevention efforts.
Neither the Reagan Administration nor Senator Helms ever
attempted to exclude all gay persons or groups as grantees; even if
there had been the desire for such an exclusion, it was practically
infeasible and politically implausible. The attack on gay identity had
now centered on expression and "no promo homo" was its theme
song.
IV. BEYOND AIDS: "No PROMO HOMO" REVISITED
The "no promo homo" language that originated in the Briggs Initi-
ative and was used to restrict AIDS education became the model for
many anti-gay legislative initiatives, in the United States and beyond.
Arizona enacted criteria for AIDS education materials in public
schools that prohibited any local district from providing instruction
that promoted a homosexual lifestyle, portrayed homosexuality as a
positive alternative lifestyle, or suggested that some methods of sex
are safe methods of homosexual sex.72 Alabama adopted similar legis-
69 Gay Men's Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
70 Id. at 302 (holding that "the grant terms are too vague to apply in a non-arbitrary
manner").
71 Id. at 291 (finding that "in using the 'offensiveness' criteria, the CDC has contravened its
statutory authority which bars funding of only of obscene, not offensive mateial").
72 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-716(C) (1992). Specifically, the statute states: "No district
shall include in its course of study instruction which:
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lation.73 In Britain, Clause 28 of the Local Government Act of 1988
stated that local governments could not "promote homosexuality or
publish material with the intention of promoting of homosexuality"
or "promote the teaching... of the acceptability of homosexuality as
a pretended family relationship."'74 Nor could government funding go
to private entities engaged in those acts.7"
Members of Congress also seemingly have become fond of the "no
promo homo" principle, reinvoking it when various issues pertaining
to homosexuality surface. In 1988, Congress relied on it twice, once
to restrict speech and once to attempt to alter a civil rights statute.
That spring, a local family planning clinic in New Hampshire fin-
ished work on a federally-funded sex education program for adoles-
cents, especially males, who, researchers found, believed that
impregnating their girlfriends and becoming fathers proved to peers
that they were not homosexual.76 The manual written for teachers
stated that "[g]ay and lesbian adolescents are perfectly normal and
their sexual attraction to members of the same sex is healthy. ' 77 Sen-
ator Gordon Humphrey introduced legislation that passed the Senate,
but died in a conference committee, which would have prohibited fed-
eral funding of sexual education materials that promoted "homosexu-
1. Promotes a homosexual lifestyle.
2. Portrays homosexuality as a positive alternative lifestyle.
3. Suggests that some methods of sex are safe methods of homosexual sex."
Id.
73 See Ala. Code § 16-40A-2(a)(8) (1992). Alabama requires that sex education programs
include "[ain emphasis, in a factual manner and from a public health perspective, that
homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general public and that homosexual conduct
is a criminal offense under the laws of the state." Id.
74 Simon Garfield, The Age of Consent, The Independent, Nov. 10, 1991, at 3.
75 Id. The basic form of Clause 28 traveled back across the Atlantic in the form of an
Oregon ballot initiative, rejected by voters in November 1992, that would have required that
"[s]tate, regional and local governments and their properties and monies shall not be used to
promote, encourage, or facilitate homosexuality." For the Record, Oregonian, Oct. 2, 1992, at
D6.
76 Rorie Sherman, Sex Education Manual Spurs Censorship Debate, Nat'l L.J., July 18,
1988, at 14; see also Clare Kittredge, Sex-Education Dispute Settled by State, Clinic, Boston
Globe, Sept. 7, 1988, at 26 (discussing how a compromise was eventually reached whereby
private financing was used to finance production of the manuals and a disclaimer added
disavowing any government approval of its contents).
77 Rod Paul, Sex Education Manual Prompts Moral Outrage, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1988, at
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ality and homosexual activity" or contained "references to
homosexuality as 'normal or natural activity.' "978
Also in 1988, Congress attempted to force the District of Columbia
to alter its municipal civil rights law, one of the first to include sexual
orientation as a protected category, by exempting religious colleges
from its scope. The District's highest court had ruled that
Georgetown University violated the local law by refusing to extend
benefits to a lesbian and gay student group. 9 Congress reacted by
conditioning federal appropriations to the District on the City Coun-
cil allowing religious schools to deny benefits or recognition to "any
person or persons that are organized for, or engaged in, promoting,
encouraging, or condoning any homosexual act, lifestyle, orientation,
or belief."' 0 Congress never defined "homosexual belief," but its
inclusion of that term signifies the recognition of and the desire to
suppress something more than (and different from) either conduct
("act") or status ("orientation").
The following year, in response to public outcry over reports that
National Endowment for the Arts ("NEA") funds had supported an
exhibit of homoerotic Robert Mapplethorpe photographs and other
controversial art, Congress enacted legislation prohibiting the NEA
from funding obscene materials "including but not limited to, depic-
tions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of
children, or individuals engaged in sex acts." s ' As anthropologist
Carole S. Vance has pointed out, this linguistic construction collapses
homoeroticism and obscenity, making the former appear to be a syno-
nym for the latter.8 2 Although homoerotic materials are simply one
78 134 Cong. Rec. 10,048 (1988).
79 Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 26 (D.C. 1987).
80 District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-462, § 145(c)(3), 102
Stat. 2269 (1988). The attempt temporarily failed when City Council members won a ruling
that the provision violated their free speech rights. Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404
(D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Congress had the
last word, however; it simply amended the D.C. human rights act directly, drawing on its
residual power over local District government. See District of Columbia Appropriations Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-168, § 141, 103 Stat. 1267, 1284 (1989).
81 Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304, 103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989).
82 Carole S. Vance, Misunderstanding Obscenity, Art in America, May 1990, at 49-55. As
Vance notes:
mThe list of sexual acts simply gives examples of depictions that might fall under the
legal definition of obscenity, after the three prongs of the Miller test are met. But these
sexual depictions or acts are not by themselves obscene. (Or, to take another example,
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example of what might meet the legal test for obscenity, the NEA
restriction comes full circle from 1950s obscenity case law by seeming
to equate the two. Its message - like that of the pre-Roth obscenity
cases-is that homoeroticism is obscene.
Subsequent developments in the arts funding controversy further
conflated gay identity with speech about sexuality. In 1990, as con-
gressional consideration of agency funding approached, then
Chairperson of the NEA John Frohnmayer denied grants recom-
mended by the agency's internal peer review process to four perform-
ance artists. Three of the four were lesbian or gay. In challenging the
denials, the artists did not claim that they lost funding because they
were gay. Rather, they asserted a viewpoint bias claim, arguing that
the NEA denied funding based on two common themes in their work,
one of which was the endorsement of equal legitimacy for homosexual
and heterosexual practices."
Each of these post-Briggs "no promo homo" campaigns utilized a
concept of homosexuality that incorporates viewpoint. Each centered
on a fight to control some public venue-whether it be arts grants,
schools, or health education materials. And each represented a step
farther away from the focus on conduct and privacy that had domi-
nated earlier case law.
V. THE EVOLUTION OF IDENTITY
The legal doctrines most relevant to lesbian and gay civil rights
litigation have evolved in tandem, not as the distinct lines of doctrine
that they sometimes appear to be, but in a dynamic tension with each
other. Expression, equality, and privacy coexist as components of
rights claims that are mutually dependent. The ban on military ser-
vice by lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals, for example, renders identi-
cal conduct such as kissing permissible or punishable based on the
sexual orientation of the actor."4 Moreover, the ban restricts self-iden-
more easily understood because it is not about sex, consider the phrase "obscene
material including but not limited to black-and-white photographs, color slides and
Cibachromes.")
Id. at 5 1.
83 See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1461 & n.5 (C.D.
Cal. 1992).
84 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to Joint Chiefs of Staff, Policy on Homosexual
Conduct in the Armed Forces, July 19, 1993.
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tifying speech with the justification that homosexual "conduct" is
antithetical to morale, good order, and discipline."5 The military ban
is a particularly rich example of the inextricability of the concepts of
expression, equality, and privacy.
The military ban also illustrates how the boundaries of legal doc-
trine shape political debates and decisions. In the aftermath of Bowers
v. Hardwick, 6 the federal judiciary divided over what has become
known as the status-conduct debate, with most courts of appeal ruling
that discrimination based on sexual orientation could not be subject to
heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause because it was
constitutionally permissible under Hardwick for a state to criminalize
sodomy, and participation in sodomy defined the class homosexual. 7
Left without a privacy-based defense against criminalization of that
conduct, advocates and some judges argued that sexual orientation
was first and foremost a status, not contingent on conduct. This rid-
dle-is homosexuality status or conduct-was purely an artifact of
the categories of legal doctrine and the outcome of a single case. Yet
it was picked up, replicated and amplified in the arguments over the
military ban. President Clinton framed his position as opposition to
discrimination "based solely on status," and, in response, congres-
sional opponents such as Senator Sam Nunn responded in part by
arguing that there was no status without conduct. That entire frame-
work grew out of Hardwick.
The doctrinal categories themselves muddy up the law. Is the
claim one of expression or of equality when a Irish gay and lesbian
group is denied participation in a St. Patrick's Day parade? Is the
exclusion of the group wanting to carry a self-identifying banner
based on speech or based on status? Are they being shut out because
of who they are or because of what they are saying? In reality, these
distinctions are artificial. In the law, they carry enormous weight. If
the defendant is a private entity, the only recourse in law is to assert
an equality claim if there is a civil rights statute that includes sexual
orientation as a prohibited classification. No right to freedom of
85 President's Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Gays and Lesbians in the Military,
29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1372 (July 26, 1993).
86 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
87 See generally Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 531
(1992) (discussing in detail both the origins of the distinction between status and conduct and
the gaps that have arisen in this discourse).
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speech exists against private actors. The state action doctrine thus
drives litigation and debate about St. Patrick's-type events into dimin-
ishing important aspects of the situation having to do specifically with
endorsement of homosexuality. Conversely, if the defendant is a pub-
lic entity, the more powerful tactic is often a speech claim, as the
student organization cases demonstrate."8
The law needs to recognize the irrationality of these distinctions as
advocates continue to press claims that require courts to consider the
meaning of homosexuality. In particular, the law needs a much more
clearly articulated conceptualization of the intrinsic role of expression
at the very heart of equality.
Self-identifying speech does not merely reflect or communicate
one's identity; it is a major factor in constructing identity. Identity
cannot exist without it. That is even more true when the distinguish-
ing group characteristics are not visible, as is typically true of sexual
orientation. Therefore, in the field of lesbian and gay civil rights,
much more so than for most other equality claims, expression is a
component of the very identity itself. This is a paradox that current
law cannot resolve.
State-imposed penalties on identity speech-on speech that pro-
motes or professes homosexuality-have multiple consequences.
First, penalizing self-identifying expression effectively nullifies any
protection under equality principles. As Justice William Brennan
noted with respect to a plaintiff who had been fired after informing
coworkers of her bisexuality, "it is realistically impossible to separate
her spoken statements from her status."' 9 Such penalties would make
the promise of equality a sham for lesbian and gay citizens, compara-
ble to denying religion-based protection to Jews who wear yarmulkes
or Christians who wear crosses.
Second, suppression of identity speech leads to a compelled false-
hood, a violation of the principle that an individual has the right not
to speak as well as to speak.90 In the absence of identity speech, most
persons are assumed to be heterosexual. To paraphrase the ACT-UP
88 See supra note 1.
89 Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1016 n.11 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
90 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that a state statute,
which forced individuals to display messages on their private property to which they were
ideologically opposed, invaded their First Amendment rights).
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slogan, silent = straight. To compel silence, then, is to force persons
who are not heterosexual in effect to lie.
Lastly, like forced speech, the collective, communal impact of
forced silence amounts to more than an accumulation of violations of
individual integrity. It creates a form of state orthodoxy.91 If speak-
ing identity can communicate ideas and viewpoints that dissent from
majoritarian norms, then the selective silencing of certain identities
has the opposite, totalitarian effect of enforcing conformity. In that
sense, homosexuality is not merely, or either, status or conduct. It is
also, independently, an idea.
In the contemporary United States, campaigns to secure state sup-
pression of sexual identity speech are a complex phenomenon.
Although they seek to control both individuals and ideas, the target of
the exclusion has shifted from the former to the latter. At stake is the
role sexuality will have in the realm of public discourse.
91 Cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion.").
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